Michael Carrick
- Visiting Assistant Professor
- Philosophy
- Applied Ethics, especially environmental ethics and bioethics, Value Theory Political and Social Phil, Business Ethics, Metaethics, Phil of Science,
Additional Information
Dissertation
My dissertation provides a theoretical foundation for a philosophy of animal welfare. I argue that a theory of welfare should appropriately fit the welfare subject being considered. However, because the class ofnonhuman animals is so large and varied, and different animals have different sets of capacities to differentdegrees, I argue that none of the major theories of welfare are a good fit for all welfare subjects. This leads meto present a variabilist conception of animal welfare: we should apply different theories of welfare to differentwelfare subjects, by applying the theory of welfare that best fits the teleological profile of the welfare subjectunder consideration. I put forth the capacity-first account of welfare, that says when determining what theoryof welfare to apply to a welfare subject, we must first look at the cognitive and emotional capacities of thewelfare subject. For those creatures with less cognitively and emotionally complex capacities, we should putmore weight on hedonistic elements when measuring their welfare, and for those creatures with greatercognitive and emotional complexities, we should put greater emphasis on the satisfaction of preferences. Iconclude the dissertation by showing how my capacity-first account of animal welfare makes a difference fortwo debates within animal ethics: holding animals in captivity and replaceability arguments in support of humane omnivorism.
Additional Information
Dissertation
My dissertation provides a theoretical foundation for a philosophy of animal welfare. I argue that a theory of welfare should appropriately fit the welfare subject being considered. However, because the class ofnonhuman animals is so large and varied, and different animals have different sets of capacities to differentdegrees, I argue that none of the major theories of welfare are a good fit for all welfare subjects. This leads meto present a variabilist conception of animal welfare: we should apply different theories of welfare to differentwelfare subjects, by applying the theory of welfare that best fits the teleological profile of the welfare subjectunder consideration. I put forth the capacity-first account of welfare, that says when determining what theoryof welfare to apply to a welfare subject, we must first look at the cognitive and emotional capacities of thewelfare subject. For those creatures with less cognitively and emotionally complex capacities, we should putmore weight on hedonistic elements when measuring their welfare, and for those creatures with greatercognitive and emotional complexities, we should put greater emphasis on the satisfaction of preferences. Iconclude the dissertation by showing how my capacity-first account of animal welfare makes a difference fortwo debates within animal ethics: holding animals in captivity and replaceability arguments in support of humane omnivorism.