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Published online: 07 Jan 2021.

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Identifying leader's intent: an analysis of Kim Jong-Un

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ABSTRACT

One of the most challenging tasks for a deterrence planner is assessing a leader's intent, which requires having an in-depth level of subject-matter expertise. This article investigates this challenge and offers answers to the following question "how can we identify a leader's intent" to aid deterrence planners, operators, and policymakers? To examine this question, we used a multi-method approach by performing several qualitative analyses on Kim Jong-Un's New Year's Eve speeches (2013–2018). We focused on techniques that assessed the underlying facets of intent (e.g. cognitive beliefs and goals). These speeches served as a viable secondary source that identified objective markers to which we applied a coding scheme to extract the adversary's "intent" to perform a particular action. This article argues that identifying intent can help policy-makers and planners understand if an adversary has plans to perform specific operations.

Deterrence, commonly known as the theory to influence state-actors through nuclear threats and capabilities, has a long history in international relations.[1] However, this perspective changed after the end of the Cold War and the United States' emergence as the leader of the new world order. Researching and understanding "deterrence" was no longer deemed necessary with the nuclear threat minimised on Russia's side. Instead, the United States took the role of the hegemon and stabilised its deterrence posture through arms control and treaty verifications.[2] Today, however, the United States faces new challenges as states, like Russia and China, are attempting to challenge the status quo, or North Korea who attempts to influence the balance of power through nuclear provocations.

These emerging threats have forced governments to re-examine deterrence from a different perspective. Specifically, how to deter by understanding the view of the adversary or leader of the state, which is also known as Tailored Deterrence.[3] Tailored deterrence is a strategy which attempts to influence a specific actor (adversary or leader) beyond just their identified nuclear capabilities. Planners for this strategy focus on multiple aspects of the actor.[4] Those aspects include understanding the actor's society, economy, military structure, and psychology, among other things outlined in a strategic profile.[5] Tailored deterrence goes beyond the implications of nuclear weapons to provide detailed insight into knowing an adversary's leader and their expected decision-making

logic to assist in producing effective options for influence.[6] However, uncovering the "intent" of the leader, which is arguably one of the critical elements of the decision-making analysis, is one of the most challenging tasks.

Intent is said to provide a window into a leader's behaviour and actions.[7] This article argues that uncovering intent will help address one of the most pressing questions when it comes to North Korea today, "how can we deter Kim Jong-Un?" Understanding a leader's mindset, specifically how and why an actor thinks the way they do in a time of conflict, are precisely the tasks that face government planners and operators today.[8] We argue that the current assessment of leadership decision-making should include clearly identified "intent variables" to help contribute towards developing tailored deterrence strategies. Which brings us to the following questions, are there reliable methods to uncover a leader's intent? And more specifically, to our case study, how do we identify Kim Jong-Un's intent?

Unfortunately, answering these questions can be very difficult due to the leader preferring secrecy and confidentiality around their decision-making processes in which to maintain the upper hand during negotiations or conflict. Understanding the thoughts underlying someone's actions and motivations is not necessarily novel: a robust body of research within the social sciences encompasses techniques that measure the psychological character of an adversary.[9] However, this body of literature is marked with disagreement in the halls of governments, where many argue that understanding the psychological characteristics of an individual during the conflict, which we call "intent" does not have enough rigour. Qualitatively assessing intent is not the same as quantitative measures that calculate a leader's capabilities. Quantitative calculations have helped planners and operators for years in developing deterrence plans and operations.[10] The combination of capability assessment to intent assessment has been a contentious one, due to the appearance of lacking quantitative rigour. Instead, a leader's intent has always relied on the subject-matter expert's knowledge of that specific adversary or leader, which takes years of research. We agree and acknowledge the difficulty of assessing intent, especially attempting to add quantitative values to the interpretation of behaviour. However, this article takes on what the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review challenged, which is the difficulty in uncovering "intention" when assessing an adversary for tailored deterrence.[11] In fact, this article argues that due to significant insight and research of the past from discourse, content, and narrative analysis on leadership provides the very insight that can help with deterrence planning.[12] Past research demonstrates that conducting qualitative analysis to uncover a leader's meaning, intent, behaviour, and ideology from speeches can support deterrence planning.[13] This article adds to this field of research by examining North Korea leadership intent through different qualitative methods and linking the results to deterrence planning. Therefore, this article offers insight towards the following general question *how can we identify a leader's intent* by presenting our findings of "Kim Jong-Un's intent" and completing a series of analyses of his public speeches and state-level activities.

To present our key findings, we organise the article in the following manner; first, we discuss and deconstruct the meaning behind "intent" and how this links to deterrence planning. During this section, we argue that just measuring a leader's capabilities does not sufficiently project their intended course of action, instead, we distinguish why intent provides significant insight into deterrence strategies and operations. Second,

we discuss our multi-method approach of three different qualitative methods, which include the application of the Schramm's (1964) *interpersonal communication model*, which measures and identifies "intent". Through Schramm's model, we identified qualities that lend themselves to communicating messages by specific leaders; in this case, beliefs and goals identified by North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un. We acknowledge the full breadth of models within the multifaceted literature to measure behaviour and selected this model due to the flexibility and adaptability for some instances and available data-sets. Mainly, we were able to include the Ligon, Hunter & Mumford's (2008) *socialised or personalised leadership orientation* which identified critical aspects of the data and recognised its relevance as regards Kim Jong-Un's intent. Finally, we crossed-examined this assessment with specific actions performed during the year of his speeches, and if those actions matched his goals. This causal sequence framework, which is a method inside of process tracing also known as a timeline analysis, is a standard and time-tested qualitative method.[14] Incorporating this method allowed us to understand if Kim Jong-Un's actions matched his messaging, which helps to identify "intent".

Finally, we present our findings through the testing of these methods with Kim Jong-Un's data showing initial conclusions that his speeches provide a very detailed roadmap for future state-level actions which match the North Korean ideology: Juche. We argue, through this process, we can pinpoint Kim Jong-Un's "intent". Overall, we claim that expanding and incorporating a multi-method approach into deterrence plans and operations; something that is lacking today, can assist in future tailored deterrence strategies for North Korea. The testing of these models with this specific case study provides significantly enhanced insights into leader intent to inform future strategy development for other cases or potential conflict areas. In sum, this multi-method approach could be applied to other leaders when developing strategies and plans for deterrence operations.

Deterrence planning today

For many years, the U.S. Department of Defense and other government agencies have tried to understand a leader's decision-making by inferring intent through their capabilities, vulnerabilities, and military movements. They have also considered such indicators as declaratory policy, doctrinal processes, military operations, military exercises/activities, policy changes, public speeches/rhetoric, financial incentives, country-to-country interactions, and military-to-military exchanges.[15] Additionally, intent is also pulled from intelligence documents, which can be problematic as "predictive intelligence is not an exact science and is vulnerable to incomplete information, adversary deception, and the paradox of warning."[16] However, we argue that possessing specific capabilities does not automatically indicate a leader intends to use them. One complaint expressed by practitioners is that doctrine does not provide a methodology for determining adversary intent, but rather only recommends that intelligence analysts go beyond capability assessment.[17]

Currently, deterrence analysis is conducted by putting together a strategic profile on the decision-making process of a targeted adversary. This profile is mainly information which planners pull to understand and analyse the perspective of the adversary in order to create "tailored options" to counter any perceived current or future threats. The profile

is a document that is similar to a country study, but rather examines how the adversary uses their history, economy, social structure, political psychology, political structure, military, and diplomacy to understand their decision-making process. Research suggests that understanding the history, motivations, cultural perspective, and the psychology of an adversary can help planners predict what they might do in military operations.[18] The profile can be structured as either an individual, or collective decision system, dependent on the institutions of the selected adversary.

The profile then informs a series of analyses done by planners and analysts on how an adversary would act; or not act, in relation to a specific action, therefore producing a decision calculus and allowing for deterrence courses of action, which is commonly referred to as "tailored deterrence". Tailored deterrence has been a contribution in this move away from just capabilities-based deterrence planning and more towards adversary decision analysis.[19] However, including a more robust analysis regarding intent could assist planners in developing a dependable decision calculus with reliable data.

Currently, the strategic profile, as outlined above, attempts to uncover the decision-making of an adversary through this understanding; but unfortunately, this still provides insufficient information. More analysis is needed to understand the leadership fully.[20] For example, once a defence analyst tries to identify what a leader intends to do against another government based on current actions, defense professionals consider deterrence options. Practitioners attempt to influence beliefs by bringing to the adversary's attention the costs it will incur if they were to decide to take a specific action. If the costs are high enough, the expectation is that the adversary will choose not to take the action they threatened. As an example, the figure below depicts the current way the U.S. Department of Defense views an adversary and, in turn, how the adversary views the United States.[21]

As Figure 1 illustrates, there is not a defined "starting" point for the process—it is cyclical. The United States or the adversary can be on any phase at a given time. For example, the adversary could conduct an action such as a missile-launch. The United States would observe the launch and infer the adversary's intent to undertake a launch, and interpret the launch by asking questions related to its possible intentions. Such questions would include: was the missile-launch a research and development test,


Figure 1. View of Adversary.

or was the launch to deter another actor? The United States will also have to decide what action(s) to take; if any, and the desired effects it wishes to achieve from that action. The figure displays the reciprocal nature of what the United States and its adversaries consider when determining intent. This model also highlights that both the United States and the adversary imperfectly observe the actions, for example, using indications and warnings, capabilities, or historical trends as the sole basis of measuring intention, thus interpreting imperfectly and increasing the risk of taking improper actions as a result.

This article offers a novel discussion on how to further an understanding of the adversary past the point of capabilities and identifying how one can turn imperfect information into more reliable evidence that could help inform analysis and decision-making. To mitigate a potential or future conflict, it is imperative that we take the necessary measures required to determine intent to inform our deterrence plans and actions. Deterrence planners need the ability to apply different types of methodologies. Doing so will provide significant insights into a leader's mindset, allowing for a more focused, tailored deterrence response with greater potential for desirable outcomes. This, in turn, will help intelligence analysts look for indications and warnings of movements, capabilities, and vulnerabilities that can provide greater insight into intent.

Due to the changing security environment, we argue that understanding the intent of the leader to help inform plans and operations is just as important as "counting" capabilities. Essentially, throughout this article we are providing the means to identify a leader's intent through the identification of Kim Jong-Un's beliefs, goals, and pursued actions.

Identifying intent

First, we must explain and define what we mean by intent. To understand intent, and its importance in deterrence analysis, a deconstruction process needs to occur. Specifically, we argue that the components which contribute to intent are beliefs and goals.[22] Without these two components, the intent of a person cannot exist. First, scholars argue that beliefs impact our actions.[23] In the context of international relations, Jervis argues that if a decision-maker desires a specific policy, they will use their belief to motivate and rationalise actions towards this policy. The desire draws from the concept that a belief can be functional towards specific actions, depending on the need from the decision-maker's point of view.[24]

Therefore, we define belief as a mental representation of reality, based on the subject's perception and past experiences, which influence interactions and behaviours in a given situation.[25] "Whether and how a given belief contributes to determining our behaviour strictly depends on the goals we are currently assessing, considering, choosing, or pursuing."[26] Moving beyond Jervis, we include goals in this process through the development of beliefs. This process is considered a single linear process where the goal is the intermediate element and shaped by the belief in the proceeding step. The belief frames the reality of the desired outcome (i.e. goal), which will either maintain the status quo or change towards a new result during the identified situation:

> After a goal has been preferred to others and chosen so that the subject has decided to do some appropriate action to bring it about, the relevant conditions for executing the action

and/or for realizing the goal can or cannot be immediately satisfied. If these conditions are present or shortly forthcoming, the intended action is put in execution, and the goals become currently and actively pursued by the agent.[27]

The goal transforms into intent when the decision-maker actively pursues the goal. The mind will conduct a series of screening tests, "in which specific beliefs act as filters" within the brain.[28] When a goal becomes an intention, a transformation occurs, mainly the "chosen goal becomes a double-faced entity, which includes a target and a vehicle" which is the actor deciding what they want to achieve and how they plan to accomplish the goal.[29] Intentions also generally have a level of specificity that includes the following, behaviour, target objective (directed at behaviour), the situation, and time.[30] Putting this in the context of North Korea, we can explain the process by the following: Kim Jong-Un's beliefs are a mental representation of his cultural perception and past experiences. He uses his beliefs to create, filter, and select specific goals he would like to activate or put towards execution. He then identifies a preferred goal to achieve within a specific situation; this action transforms into the leader's intent. The difference between objectives and intent is when Kim Jong-Un selects specific goals; but if he fails to pursue the selected goals actively, then that action is not considered intent. The intent is identified when there is an active pursuit of the goal. Putting this into the context of speeches, if Kim Jong-Un lists specific goals in his speech, this does not necessarily mean he intends to achieve them. It is only during the active pursuit of the goal does it turn into intent. Beliefs shape goals, which; when activated, become intent.

Understanding the process of how beliefs and goals contribute to intent is necessary for terms of contributing to tailored deterrence strategies. As referenced above, deterrence aims at preventing goals from being actively pursued by an adversary. This insight gives deterrence professionals the ability to target and plan operations based on identified intentions.

This information helps to update and develop influence options, which can turn into tailored deterrence messages. These messages speak specifically to the identified actor or selected target. Therefore, deterrence professionals need to understand the leader's intent, in combination with their capabilities, historical trends, and decision patterns effectually to impact an adversary's decision-making.

Decoding messages

The argument of "how can we identify intent" is not necessarily new, in fact academic scholars have been trying to uncover leadership intention for years.[31] Through research, narratives have shown to link a leadership's minds to their society, "human beings think, perceive, imagine, and make moral choices according to the narrative structures."[32] Narratives, which happen in the speeches of leaders, have the ability to express identity which is "considered dialogical and rooted in the text that individuals construct to make sense of their lives."[33] This "narrative reveals how leaders position themselves within the social context of the society, craft a discourse to express and even validate their position."[34]

Intent was also discovered by Coffey (2005) when measuring gubernatorial ideology through content analysis on speeches.[35] Coffey explains that speeches detail "what a governor intends to do or wishes to have done are ideal for predicting or explaining his or

her subsequent actions."[36] The argument behind analysing and deconstructing speeches is that "political activity does not exist without the use of languages, and politics is predominately constituted in language".[37] Therefore, Fetzer and Bull (2012) were able to uncover an intent verb through their analysis of micro speeches.[38] The "intention verb" conveys:

> Information about the politician's intentions and foregrounds those activities in the domain of the party politics which depict the politician's leadership style regarding competence. The construct indicates that the speaker makes explicit his intention to perform a particular action, thus portraying him as a decisive political agent leading his party or government in accordance with his plans. Intention verbs were used less frequently as making promises or pledges puts them in a politically vulnerable position to keep their promise or pledge.[39]

Scholars essentially argue that leaders who want to express their intentions speak in narratives, and those are done through speeches in order to communicate to their followers. When communicating intentions, there is a specific expectation and accountability formed on the message receiver's side, making the leader in a politically vulnerable position to adhere to their narrative. Which Simons, Leroy, Collenwaert, and Masschelein (2015) claim is the development of behavioural integrity formation, which is explained as a "perceived pattern of alignment between an actor's words and deeds or the extent to which actors are seen to keep promises".[40] This dynamic is very important to the follower-leader relationship as it promotes trust between the two entities. Scholars argue that "When leaders consistently follow through on values and commitments, they send unambiguous signals about desired and undesired behaviours. In doing so, followers get a clearer message about what is expected of them, which will translate into followers being better able to meet those expectations."[41]

This specific outlook and follower-leader relationship is perceived as vital in the North Korean model, where adherences to the leadership and its "Juche" (self-reliance) ideology is necessary for continued survival of the regime. The ideology forms the foundation and the guiding principles of the state, whilst also serving as an umbrella under which the goals of the leader are carried out. Our analysis includes the examination of the Juche ideology and how Kim Jong-Un codes and de-codes his messages during his narratives, along with how his regime controls the media. North Korean officials, those who are responsible for dissemination these messages, recognise the difference between propaganda that communicates legitimate internal and/or external insights to convey policy or to signal decisions.[42] North Korean officials learn to analyse how the U.S. government rationalise and interpret deterrence theory.[43] The extent to which the average North Korean citizen understands or is aware of the effect's regime messages have externally on deterrence planning is still unknown.

Juche ideology

We argue that there is value in understanding the Juche philosophy of North Korean political culture to help identify the beliefs, intent, and coding of the messages given during narratives and speeches. These beliefs began during the reign of Kim Il-Sung and have carried on under the leadership of Kim Jong-Il and Kim Jong-Un, as well. Unlike Kim Jong-Un's grandfather and father, much less is known about Kim Jong-Un, his age,

experience, and what direction he intends to take North Korea. Therefore, understanding the ideology and how he codes and decodes his messages are essential to this research. Below we briefly discuss the history, development, and integration of this ideology to explain its contribution to the analysis and deterrence.

Juche is considered a form of control in the North Korean culture. Kim Il-Sung, the "Great Leader", introduced the ideology, which was carried on by Kim Jong-Il the "Dear Leader" and continued by Kim Jong-Un the "Great Successor."[44] The ideology was initiated by Kim Il-Sung to influence the mindset of the people of North Korea. The ideology teaches North Koreans self-dependence and the rejection of foreign assistance. In fact, Juche itself means "self-reliant", where the people need to rely on themselves and build a strong sense of nationalism.[45] Under Juche, the people expect to demonstrate complete loyalty to the leader. However, any contradictions experienced or witnessed by people of the society are told that "what was happening was for the good of Korea" and used as "acceptable justification."[46]

Juche ideology has an in-depth indoctrination process North Koreans go through daily. There are two messages of obedience: "(1) without the brain, the rest does not function; therefore, there must be complete loyalty and (2) independent thinking was not needed since the brain handled this."[47]

The three generations of leaders in North Korea have managed to maintain control of the population out of fear for their lives and being thrown into a North Korea death camp for any number of reasons.

The origins of the ideology and current state culture can be traced back to the Japanese occupation of Korea.[48] During this time there was a complex interplay between Koreans and foreign powers which profoundly shaped and developed Juche.[49] It was from the 1930s through to the 1950s that the historical roots of the regime resulted in the "Arduous March Kim Il Sung" that fought for independence through the work of anti-Japanese guerrillas.[50] The goal and subsequence victory were to resist any outside assistance and establish a state that would exhibit "purity of the indigenous".[51] At the end of the Korean War, this was considered a time of incomparable devastation with many local challenges. The Soviet Union refused to provide any assistance, and the north began to view the Soviets with contempt. The deep resentment that occurred provided the seeds in which patriotic slogans grew and spread, which is argued as the formation of the Juche ethos.[52]

As a result, North Korea developed a unique system, different from those of other Eastern European socialist states. While North Korea may share some of the basic features of the modern state and some of the characteristics common to socialist states, its "distinguishing characteristics resulted from its early interactions with the Soviet Union."[53]

The introduction of Juche philosophy and Kimilsungism began during the reign of Kim Il-Sung. "Kimilsungism is the leader's revolutionary thought because the idea and theory advanced by the leader are original."[54] Kimilsungism is the original idea from Kim Il-Sung, which cannot be explained within the framework of Marxism-Leninism since there are deviations from this system.[55] Jong argues that "Kimilsungism" advances Marxism-Leninism beyond their problems and offers a novel approach within a "new age different from the era that gave rise to Marxism-Leninism."[56] The view offered new prediction and supposition, raising new questions regarding the method of "leadership in

the revolutionary theory of the working class and elucidated it in a comprehensive way."[57] The ideas of Kimilsungism and Marxism-Leninism are not that one is better than another, but that they are relevant during the historical eras in which they were created. However, Kimilsungism is still relevant in the era of Juche, and it still remains the fundamental philosophy in North Korea today. The North Korean people are required to understand how to apply the Juche ideology to their everyday life.[58]

Kim Jong-Il argues that in order to establish Juche as an ideology means that people must have mastery of "the revolution and construction, and acquiring the viewpoint and attitude of solving all questions by one's own talents and initiative." [59] Kim Jong-Il claims that his people are the "masters of the revolution, and to carry out the revolution in one's country successfully is the basic mission of the party and people of one's country."[60] He extends this revolution to the world, claiming that North Korea will only be successful when every country is successful in establishing Juche.

The Juche philosophy plays a role in North Korean national pride and has built a belief that such pride is unconquerable and any nation without it is powerless.[61] Kim Jong-Il extended the beliefs and built upon Juche with Songun, or "military first."[62] Similar to communism, Songun creates a belief system that the military is always right, and therefore people must follow the military to maintain this perception. "It is no longer the Korean Workers' Party that leads the way, neither is it the government that assumes the role of leadership."[63] Theorist claim that Songun advanced Juche ideology through adding a realistic perspective on the history and politics of the world.[64] The Songun (military first) addition to Juche expands on the idea of self-reliance by highlighting North Korean military excellence. Therefore North Korea prides itself on having "successive meetings and deliberations at all levels of society", including the military itself.[65] These meetings will have the participants begin with confessions or wrongdoings, "regardless of that person's standing in the social and political strata."[66]

Through this brief historical evolution of Juche, the apparent trend of North Korean leaders is to extend the ideology by adding in their own unique contributions and making the ideology relevant into the circumstances of the present.[67] Kim Jong-Un continues to grow the country economically through Byungjin or "parallel paths" focusing on the economy and the military despite international sanctions. Furthermore, North Korea's nuclear programme has advanced substantially under Kim Jong-Un's rule with tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles, intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and a thermonuclear device.[68]

Juche ideology proves to be a contribution to the basic beliefs of the North Korea culture, and specifically the past leaders of North Korea. It is through this ideology that we see the baseline of what is a central belief or goal of the current leader. This reference point helps to identify how he codes and decodes messages during his narratives. There can be various interpretations of Juche, and one predominant concept is that the North Korean system is "built around one individual's ability to make all of the decisions and command all of the power" established during the period of Kim Il-Sung.[69]

We argue that understanding the guiding principles of Juche help to gain a better understanding of what it means when Kim Jong-Un speaks of Juche in his speeches, which are tied to his beliefs and goals. His domestic audience likely understands being "self-reliant" as relying on locally provided goods vise imported goods or any outside

aid. We use Juche to identify the underlining belief structure and contribute towards the connection of the intent variables.

Multi-method approach

For this article, we used three different qualitative methods to identify and assess leader intent, which is considered a multi-method approach. First, we used Schramm's interpersonal communication model, which argues that the messages delivered by leadership are coded, and the public receiving this messaging must decode the message (see Figure 2). Schramm's model has an extensive history in understanding leadership and mass communication from an authoritarian point of view. Schramm applied his model to understand how Soviet authoritarianism orchestrated mass communication as an instrument of the state and the Party. He claims that Soviet leadership was successful because they knew how to combine obligation with persuasion, building a media force that operated to support the system. Schramm's analysis of the Soviet system uncovered how they were able to: remove the profit motive from media; move beyond forbidding the press to criticise the regime in positive and productive ways; use media to help accomplish change desired by the Party; and finally, integrate media into the total communication system to support the Soviet system.[70] We found that Schramm's historical model's components applies to the current analysis of North Korea.

First, messages delivered through a leader's speech hold different meanings learned by different people. A message can also have external and hidden meanings.[71] Schramm's model suggests that an individual's beliefs, values, experiences, and learned meanings apply to either an individual, or part of a group. Furthermore, the model explains that communication is circular, equal, and reciprocal, and the listener can receive and send messages.[72]

Other facets of messages that impact communication between two individuals are intonations and pitch patterns, accents, facial expressions, quality of voice, and gestures. Schramm's philosophy alleged that these elements were essential functions of communication in society. He believed that people in a society (including a closed community) need information on their environment and methods of communicating to make

Figure 2. Schramm's Communication Model. Siebert, Fred S., et al. Four Theories of the Press: The Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility, and Soviet Communist Concepts of What the Press Should Be and Do. University of Illinois Press, 1956.

decisions and enhance economic development. Taking Schramm's work, Singhal tested and confirmed that "efficient communication works for a dictator as for a democrat-probably better, in fact, for the dictator because he is more likely to seize a monopoly over communication."[73] We are translating this into our case study with Kim Jong-Un; we assess that this leader uses communication to influence the people of North Korea as a dictator. He seizes a monopoly over communication, and he alone controls what the country sees and hears. Schramm believed that an individual's knowledge, experience, and cultural upbringing also play an essential role in communication. People from different cultures, religion, or background tend to interpret the message in different ways. For example, Schramm was the first to recognise the importance of communication in developing countries. Notably, he argued that "the mass media could better the lives of people by supplementing the information resources of local schools, multiplying the contacts of development agency field workers, and encouraging people to expose themselves and their children to learning opportunities."[74]

Examining Kim Jong-Un's speeches through Schramm's communication model provides insight into the leader's communication style and enhances the ability to mitigate against miscalculation of the adversary's intent. Therefore, when using Schramm, the leader will frame their goals by assessing their desires, motivations, wants, and needs through speeches. For our approach, we categorised Kim Jong-un's speeches as either a belief or a goal, which we argue as contributing to intent. By categorising his statements into two distinct classifications, this allowed us to decode specific messages he communicates to his followers, allowing us to understand how he communicates intent through Schramm's model of communication.[75]

Understanding Juche, and the self-reliance the philosophy enforces, helped us to decode his messages targeted to his constituents. We took this ideology and built an evidence-based coding scheme applied to measure intent using secondary sources, Kim Jong-Un's New Year's Eve speeches. In order to ensure the New Year's speeches were a reputable source to use for our case study, we elicited the recommendation of a former CIA analyst with decades of experience analysing and monitoring North Korea media with native speaking translators.[76] It is understood by government experts that North Korean New Year's speeches have a long record of focusing on internal issues and usually contain sections that Pyongyang knows Seoul and Washington will read with particular interest. The New Year's speeches are understood as the themes and nuances the North Korean leader needs to communicate to his domestic audience. The speeches are considered "benchmarks, goals, signals, beliefs–in short, as they reflect the leader's *intentions*, not literally what he thinks. In fact, from year to year they are extremely important windows into North Korea policy calculations."[77]

Many critics are quick to dismiss much of the media communication coming out of North Korea as nothing more than untrustworthy propaganda. It's been argued that the interpretations of North Korean media by the West depict a " … weak, desperate, and starving country with no money and no friends."[78] However, we took a different approach with applying our methodology to identify goals and beliefs that essentially recreated Schramm's interpersonal communication model, but with the latest research and a new case. The evidence-based coding method extracted 80 remarks, where the average length of each speech was about 4,345 words, from Kim Jong-Un's New Year's Eve speeches from 2013–2018.[79]

Second, Schramm's model was combined with work by research on leadership orientation.[80] This research claims that there are two categories of leadership that can be associated with "positive or negative behaviours for attaining outcomes", specifically: socialised or personalised leadership. Ligon, Hunter, and Mumford coded life history narratives from 120 historical leaders to gather information and critical incidences from personalised and socialised leaders' lives. Socialised leaders, they argue, base the identification and solution of problems on the good of others, or for the collective interests of their group. They are more concerned with group survival than of protection of their own position within the group. Socialised leaders also tend to be more altruistic, self-controlled, and follower-oriented. Such leaders tend to have a commitment to others, and they instill followers' self-responsibility, self-initiative, and autonomy when solving organisational problems.

Alternatively, personalised leaders are motivated by personal dominance regardless of the consequence of others. They control others with threats and use others to advance their own personal agendas. It seems that personalised leaders often distrust others, viewing followers as objects with little regard for their well-being, safety, or happiness. Personalised leaders' need for power is unfettered by responsibility or activity inhibition. Due to low affiliated needs, coupled with high dominance drives, times of perceived threat may lead to personalised leaders taking impulsive actions to protect themselves at the expense of their group.

We used Ligon, Hunter, and Mumford's indices of socialised and personalised orientation found in Table 1 to code Kim Jong-Un's extracted and categorised beliefs and goals from his speeches. The raters for the applied method during the 2013–2015 speeches were graduate students trained to apply physiological coding schemes to speech data. The instructions given made no references Kim Jong-Un, nor were they informed that the remarks depicted were extracted from his New Year's Eve speeches. Consequently, because the raters were not likely to recognise the profiled person, their assessments were based on the *personality profiles* rather than on existing knowledge, political prejudices, or personal perceptions linked with Kim Jong-Un. Coding for the 2016–2018 speeches were the authors of this article who are trained in narrative and domain analysis. The graduate students were no longer available for recent statements. However, the findings regarding the new speeches were congruent with graduate student coding.

Table 1. Socialised and personalised Index.

Socialised	Personalised
Humility	Focus on the dependency of followers to the leader
Follower empowerment	Object Beliefs (others are objects, not people)
Collective Leadership/Power-sharing	Negative Life Themes
Emphasis on the success of group/people	Superiority/Self-aggrandisement
Focus on succession planning/long-term goals	Status
Setting destructive goals for followers	Supernatural Divinity bestowed on the leader
Use of destructive influence tactics with followers	Power Differences
Concern for others (altruism)	Setting destructive goals for followers to pursue
Focus on Social Consensus	Using destructive influence tactics with followers (coercive, threatening)
	Paranoid tendencies (e.g. actively seeks and attends to signs of mistreatment of others)

Each leadership orientation was coded as being present or not present within each remark from the speeches. An example of a statement extracted from Kim Jong-Un's 2013 New Year's Eve speech is as follows:

> We should invariably carry forward the proud tradition of single-hearted unity, the tradition of adorning the red flag of the revolution only with victories on the strength of the harmonious whole wherein the party believes in the people, and the latter trust and follow the former.[81]

We identified this remark as a goal, which was categorised based on our earlier discussion of beliefs and goals, and of the 19 identifiers measured eight were socialised, and zero were personalised, which indicates this remark is a socialised goal. The identifiers that were present for this particular example included: socialised identifiers were "Follower empowerment, Collective Leadership/Power-sharing, Emphasis on success of group/people, focus on succession planning/long-term goals, setting destructive goals for followers, use of destructive influence tactics with followers, concern for others (altruism), focus on social consensus."

The purpose behind this coding was to produce nation state leadership personality characterisations as comprehensive as possible which helped also to identify the activities associated with those beliefs and goals, and if they would transition toward intent. Additionally, determining Kim Jong-Un's leadership orientation allowed us to identify how he codes and decodes messages to his followers, which will be discussed further during the findings section. Additionally, this identification process could possibly give insight towards if he could be influenced or persuaded through outside messages based on his leadership orientation and message coding. For instance, when understanding if he holds more socialised tendencies, rather than personalised, how do we code our messages to him so that he might be more receptive?

Third, we performed a causal sequence framework (which is a method inside of process tracing), also known as a timeline analysis of Kim Jong-Un's coded messages (goals) during his New Year's Eve speeches and cross-examined them with pursued goals or identified accomplishments that North Korea performed from 2013–2018.[82] The timeline analysis allowed us to duplicate visually all the activities in pursuit or achieved by the leader and understand if this matched his message (goal) that same year. Specifically, our variables included: Selected goals during the New Year's Eve speeches (independent variables), and if the goal were pursued, or achieved (dependent variable). The coding scheme within the timeline analysis identifies if the goal were pursued or achieved during each of the year's speeches, which supported the evidence collected through various secondary resources. Necessarily, if the goals were pursued or achieved, this would indicate that the goal was transitioning or transitioned into an intent of Kim Jong-Un. The timeline identifies variables that could determine whether an expressed goal would be pursued or achieved in the future (however, not all were assessed). A more robust collection of variables could be tested if further research on this area is desired, to provide a holistic collection of his intent. However, due to the purposes of this research, which was to test if intent could be measured, a smaller sample sized was deemed appropriate.

This final method is an important contribution of the multi-method approach, as it identifies if goals, in fact, turn into intent. We argue that this multi-method approach

could ultimately help us understand how Kim Jong-Un codes and de-codes his messages to his people, and if these coded messages, in fact, correlate to his intent of specific actions. Multi-method research, which is the inclusion of two or more qualitative research methods, provides a deeper level of analysis than just decoding his speeches. The findings we present below could significantly inform deterrence plans and operations, specifically by providing a leader's intent.

Findings

Below are the findings using the multi-method approach in assessing Kim Jong-Un's intent. The graphs represent the trends over six years throughout the New Year's Eve speeches of Kim Jong-Un. The figures are broken out by remarks that were identified as goals of Kim Jong-Un and those that were beliefs. As discussed above, beliefs and goals combine to produce intent. Therefore, we identified his beliefs and goals during each speech. The graphs also depict the number of personalised verses socialised identifiers. The first graph shows that Kim Jong-Un's beliefs vary from personalised to socialised, but more often than not, personalised. If personalised leaders feel their personal power is threatened, they have a need to protect it by influencing the group. Therefore, he codes his belief comments during his speeches in a personalised nature. Purposely, during his belief remarks, he focuses on superiority, status, and setting goals for followers to pursue, translating into a personalised leadership orientation and connecting with Juche ideology (Figure 3).

However, once he communicates his beliefs in a personalised manner, he switches his orientation towards a socialised delivery while he communicates the goals for his people to follow. The graph below shows that Kim Jong-Un's goals are delivered continuously through socialised messages and support his goals with Juche. We found both personalised and socialised leadership orientation in his speeches. He is mainly coding his messages of beliefs into personalised messages, but decoding his goals to his followers as socialised messages (Figure 4).

For our first section of the analysis, we found that Kim Jong-Un's fundamental values feed his personalised beliefs, and he crafts those beliefs as socialised goals which speak to his followers through the style of Juche. He uses the history and foundational knowledge


**Figure 3.** Number of socialised or personalised per Belief.

Figure 4. Number of socialised or personalised per Goal.

of Juche to further his message and support his claim as a leader. Additionally, this analysis shows that Kim Jong-Un uses Juche to help with the socialised delivery, especially with the goals he communicates. This could imply that Kim Jong-Un speeches communicate that he cares for the good of the North Korean people more than himself, which strengthens his leader-follower relationship. However, due to uncovering his personalised beliefs, Kim Jong-Un sees *himself as the country* and that he is "good" for the country. Which, as others would argue, is in line with Juche ideology, that Kim Jong-Un presents himself as a caring leader.[83] In sum, like many personalised leaders, Kim Jong-Un believes in superiority, status, and setting goals to stay in power. However, he needs to make sure his people support this orientation by following a collective goal, thus communicating the goal in a socialised manner and speaking in line with the Juche ideology.

Through these findings, we argue that Kim Jong-Un has been able to craft meticulously his messages and he is exceptionally gifted in the art of communication to his country, which in turn, leads to self-preservation. Initially, this pattern is showing from his New Year's Eve speeches, but perhaps more beliefs and goals can be uncovered with additional speeches providing more data to support this pattern.

Additionally, we took this analysis deeper and examined if Kim Jong-Un's speeches turn into specific action, or are they just goals set before the people. Meaning, can we answer the question: does he actively pursue or achieve a goal? This would then identify his intent and produce an "intent variable" for deterrence planning. We performed a timeline analysis of significant events gathered from secondary data from 2013–2018, and cross-examined this with the coded speeches (Table 2). The timeline analysis highlights the significant accomplishments of North Korea, which were outlined as his socialised goals during the speeches. We performed a small sample size by a random selection of the identified goals, assessing only four of his stated goals during each year. Therefore, we did not assess all his goals during each speech or year. Below, we present the goals and identified them as either being pursued and/or achieved, coding them as 1 - present and 0 – not present. If both columns received 0,0 then the goal is not associated with intent. The distinction between pursuing and achieving a goal is important as it identifies his intent. As discussed above, a goal is turned into intent once there is active pursuit of the goal (or achievement). Through our analysis, we identified if there were activities in attempt pursue, or if a goal was already achieved. If there were no activities in pursuit, or none of them were achieved, then this would represent that his goals communicated during the speech were not part of his intent.

Table 2. Timeline Analysis of Intent.

Goals	Achieved	Pursuing	Evidence[a]
2013			
Increase market economy with fruit, farming, fish, and livestock	1	0	Agriculture production grew 1.9% in 2013, expanded due to favourable weather conditions and appropriate pest control
Increase basic industry in electric and rail	1	0	Light industry increase, 1.4%, production of items such as food, textile & clothing products and shoes rose
Military personnel readiness	1	1	2013 February - UN approves fresh sanctions after North Korea stages its third nuclear test, said to be more powerful than the 2009 test.
Development of Pyongyang	1	1	April 12,2017 Ryomyong Street opens in Pyongyang
2014			
Increased agricultural production	1	0	Production in agriculture grew by 1.2% in 2014, despite a slowdown in production of cultivated crops following decreased production of corn and potatoes, livestock production shifted to an increase centering around
Make positive efforts to defend national security and peace	0	1	2014 March - North Korea test-fires two medium-range Rodong ballistic missiles for the first time since 2009, in violation of UN resolutions and just hours after the US, South Korea and Japan met in the Netherlands for talks.
Improve standard of living	1	0	Services sector increase by 1.3%, increased production of wholesale & retail trade and restaurants & accommodation (+0.8%), transportation & communication (+1.1%), and government services (+1.6%)
Construction of buildings: homes and offices	1	0	Construction moved up 1.4%, driven mainly by growth in building construction
2015			
Improve the people's standard of living - construction sector build cultural establishments and dwelling houses	1	0	Services sector increased by 0.8%, centering around government services, wholesale & retail trade and communications. Construction moved up 4.8%, boosted by growth in both building construction and civil engineering
Further demonstrate our country's might as a military power by bringing about a fresh turn in building revolutionary armed forces and enhancing its defence capability	0	1	2015 September - North Korea confirms it has put its Yongbyon nuclear plant - mothballed in 2007 - back into operation
Requesting dialogue and negotiations with the South	1	1	2018 April - Kim Jong-un becomes first North Korean leader to enter the South when he meets South Korean President Moon Jae-in for talks at the Panmunjom border crossing. They agree to end hostile actions and work towards reducing nuclear arms on the peninsula.
Open to holding summit meetings	1	1	2018 June - Kim Jong-un and US President Donald Trump's historic meeting in Singapore seeks to end a tense decades-old nuclear stand-off. A follow-up meeting in Hanoi in February 2019 breaks down after North Korea refuses nuclear disarmament in return for lifting economic sanctions.
2016			
Resolve the electricity problem: corrective action to existing power stations to run at full capacity	0	1	Electricity, gas & water production expanded by 22.3%. The strong rise in production of electricity was mainly due to a rebound in hydroelectric and thermal power generation

(Continued)

Table 2. Continued.

Goals	Achieved	Pursuing	Evidence[a]
Construction: production facilities, educational and cultural intuitions and dwelling houses	0	1	Construction moved up 1.2%, boosted by the growth in both building construction and civil engineering
Coal-mining industry should rise the fierce flames of an upsurge in production	1	0	Mining production increased by 8.4%, owing to coal, lead and zinc extraction
Defence capability should be built up: Red and Young Red Guards should intensify combat and political training and fully prepare themselves to defend their villages (year of first declared hydrogen bomb test) 2017	0	1	2016 January - Government announcement of first hydrogen bomb test met with widespread expert skepticism
Preparatory work completes in 2016 for ICBM launch: strongest military emphasis highlighted in 2017 NYE speech	1	0	2017 January - Kim Jong-un says North Korea is in the final stages of developing long-range guided missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. 2017 July - Pyongyang test fires a long-range missile into the Sea of Japan, with some experts stating the missile could potentially reach Alaska.
We must further strengthen the political and military positions of socialism into an invincible fortress	0	1	Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy
Develop and produce more our-style powerful Juche weapons to relentlessly reinforce the arsenal of the military-first revolution	1	0	The country has fired 23 missiles during 16 tests since February, further perfecting its technology with each launch.
Rapidly develop: machine industry production increase: new tractors, multipurpose farm machines 2018	1	0	In a parade of new tractors KJU shows West North Korea can still move forward amid sanctions
Claim historic victory in building DPRKs nuclear forces as a springboard for fresh progress	1	0	January 4, 2018: President Trump and President Moon Jae-in agree to postpone the annual "Foal Eagle" U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises until after the Winter Olympics in South Korea in an effort to "de-conflict" the Games and "focus on ensuring the security" of the event.
The United States and South Korea should discontinue all the nuclear war drills they stage with outside forces, as these drills will engulf this land in flames and lead to bloodshed on our sacred territory	1	0	January 4, 2018: President Trump and President Moon Jae-in agree to postpone the annual "Foal Eagle" U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises until after the Winter Olympics in South Korea to "de-conflict" the Games and "focus on ensuring the security" of the event.
We will open our doors to anyone from South Korea, including the ruling party and opposition parties, organisations and individual personages of all backgrounds, for dialogue, contact, and travel, if they sincerely wish national concord and unity	1	0	January 9, 2018: Representatives from North and South Korea meet at Panmunjom in the demilitarised zone for the first inter-Korean talks since 2015. The two sides agree to reopen a military-to-military hotline that had been closed since February 2016 and North Korea announces it will send a delegation to the 2018 Winter Olympics in South Korea, although it makes a "strong complaint" after South Korean representatives propose talks on denuclearisation.
Now is not time for the north and the south to turn their backs on each other and merely express their respective standpoints; it is time that they sit face to face with a view to holding sincere discussions over the issue of improving inter-Korean relations by	1	0	April 27, 2018: North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in meet in Panmunjom on the border of North and South Korea in the first high-level summit between Kim and Moon and the third ever meeting of North and South Korean leaders. Kim and Moon issue a joint declaration,

Table 2. Continued.

Goals	Achieved	Pursuing	Evidence[a]
our nation itself and seek a way out for its settlement in a bold manner			including agreements to facilitate "groundbreaking advancement" in inter-Korean relations, "to make joint efforts to practically eliminate the danger of war on the Korean peninsula," and to cooperate to "establish a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula."

[a]Evidence collected for timeline analysis, Bank of Korea retrieved from: https://www.bok.or.kr/eng/bbs/E0000634/list.do?menuNo=400069; BBC Timeline retrieved from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-15278612; 38 North retrieved from: https://www.38north.org/2017/07/hferon071817/; North Korea Economy Watch retrieved from: https://www.nkeconwatch.com/category/organizaitons/bank-of-korea/; Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy retrieved from https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron; CNN North Korea's Missile Tests: What you need to know retrieved from: https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/29/asia/north-korea-missile-tests/index.html; Mirror's Kim Jong-Un's latest arsenal? retrieved from: https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/kim-jong-uns-latest-arsenal-11665031; Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy retrieved from: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron; Yonhap News Agency, Declaration issued at inter-Korean summit retrieved from: https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20180427013900315

Based on our initial findings from the sampling, Kim Jong-Un states his goals in the New Year's Eve speeches with the full intention of actively pursuing or achieving them the same year, which supports the behavioural integrity formation discussion. This shows that when Kim Jong-Un consistently follows through on his stated goals, he is signaling his desired behaviours, giving his followers a clearer message about what is expected of them and how they can achieve those expectations.

One interesting finding, that could be significant, is that we found no goals stated that were not actively pursued or achieved that year. Meaning, in order to continue receiving the obedience he desires from his followers (encouraged by Juche), he must show progress towards his stated goals given during New Year's Eve speeches, which he did. We interpret that Kim Jong-Un's focus since gaining power has been on military and economic progress, which supports his contribution of Byungjin to the Juche ideology. Through our analysis of his speeches, we acknowledge that he is actively coding his socialised messages to connect them to activities to accomplish throughout the year. For example, Kim Jong-Un will state a goal that he believes he can pursue, or achieve to, appear that he is keeping his promises which he thinks will bring trust between the follower-leader dynamic. Therefore, his goals are more focused on military advancement or development, in order to preserve loyalty from his followers as he believes they are important qualities for regime survival.

Lastly, if the goal is focused on the economy, then we argue that there could be uncertainty from the followers regarding the economy, so in order to keep a strong follower-leader relationship, he needs to show progress in this realm. Furthermore, if the speeches are not focused on the military or economy, then he has confidence in his follower-leader relationship, and may not fear too much on his position as a leader. However, we also acknowledge that there are many drivers in the North Korea society and internal politics that could also influence his speeches, therefore this is just one aspect that could contribute to the understanding of his intent. Thus, based on our initial findings, we argue that Kim Jong-Un has an "intent roadmap" which communicates his beliefs and goals at the beginning of each year that is meant to sustain a follower-leader relationship. He will

actively pursue or accomplish his goals outlined in that speech to ensure loyalty from his followers and show accountability from leadership.

Discussion

Based on our analysis, we argue that we can identify Kim Jong-Un's intent through his New Year's Eve speeches. Through Juche indoctrination, he matches his speeches through tailored messages. His annual speech reinforces his beliefs as a personalised leader, but also communicates his socialised goals as a map for his followers. These socialised goals are then enhanced through the actions and perceived accomplishments throughout the year. Actions can also be messages; therefore, he is continuing his message for the year by accomplishing his goals and achieving behavioural integrity.

How can this analysis help to deter Kim Jong-Un from using nuclear weapons? Our finding strongly suggests that if you can decode a leader's messages and understand his intent; then through deterrence planning and operations, influence is possible. For many planners, deterrence starts at preventing intended action. We argue that our analysis can help uncover intended action from leaders who communicate their future plans. If planners can identify the leadership's intent beforehand, then deterrence strategies and operations can be tailored to those specific goals selected for action over the forthcoming months or years. For example, Kim Jong-Un's intent is to communicate measurable and achievable military strength and economic progress as goals to his followers during the first of the year. Then, he plans to show achievement of those goals throughout the year to build a positive leader-follower relationship. If deterrence planning and operations are to be successfully against Kim Jong-Un, planners will need to focus on his speeches and his goals for that coming year. Since his goals point to military strength, planners can focus on what he plans to achieve and focus on building objectives either to imply costs, and entice benefits as regards those goals. This means, based on our analysis, planners will be able to identify his yearly intentions from the New Year's Eve speeches and incorporate those into deterrence objectives and operations. We may never be able to deter leadership before they select their goals for action, but if we know which goals they are selected, we are that much closer to deterrence.

Conclusion

Our initial question for this article was, *how can we identify a leader's intent*? Through our research on North Korea, we argue that intent is a building block towards understanding the adversary's mindset and path towards action which will lead to better developed and informed deterrence planning. However, we do recognise that there are limitations to our research and proposed methodology. Specifically, this research only presents one case, which is supported by a small sample size when creating the causal sequence framework for goals to intent. We also recognise that *selection bias* may have been present when gathering evidence to contribute to the identifying intent. We acknowledged this since most of the goals selected were either pursued, or achieved, within the framework. Therefore, to enhance this methodology further in this regard and to control for selection bias, you would need to assess all the identified goals in terms of pursuit/achievement.

Despite these limitations, we hope to aid others in answering additional questions, such as: can Kim Jong-Un be deterred from using a nuclear weapon? Or, can the United States negotiate successfully with North Korea? There are many scholars and professionals who are trying to decrypt the personality, beliefs, and goals of the North Korea leader. Here, we provided a few insights and ultimately argue that the leader's intent can and should be assessed, even though it may be subjective and complex. We selected and extended time-tested methodologies, ones that could be combined and flexible to fit the data collected. Based on our assessment and findings we offer the following recommendations.

First, we recommend that government leadership include analysis, similar to the above, that focuses on a leader's intent. The diversity of our model allowed us to breakdown a leader's thought process which translated it into how does the leader communicate, what style does he use, and does he use that communication to support his goals. This can be done by increasing the results of research similar to this within deterrence planning documents like the strategic profile.

Second, we recommend that government leadership rely on intent variables into deterrence plans and operations rather than just capabilities. We are not saying that these plans do not account for intent thus far, but rather challenge strategies to include a different approach that extends beyond looking specifically at how many capabilities a leader possess. We suggest including insight into what a leader communicates, how they communicate, and their actions connected to that communication. We acknowledge this is a lengthy process and takes a certain amount of skill and detail. However, perhaps this could alleviate some of the risks associated with miscalculations as discussed above.

For example, if an adversary country has a leader who does not care about the people but uses them to advance his personalised beliefs, then applying sanctions to that country as a means of deterrence will not affect them. Sanctions typically have more of an effect on the general population than on the leadership, and if that leadership is still receiving their goods and services, then this will have minimal impact. Furthermore, if an adversary has a roadmap of the socialised goals in which they communicate to their constituents, accomplishing those goals will contribute to their survival.

Third, we recommend that if planners and analysts use these methodologies or similar, they increase their ability to recognise both short and long-term strategies of an adversary. By doing so they can potentially avoid miscalculation (i.e. deterrence failure) when applying tailored deterrence strategies.

Finally, we acknowledge that there is space for further research, especially expanding this multi-method approach towards other adversaries and timelines. For example, what insight could we learn from decoding Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il's speeches? What variation would we discover from those speeches to Kim Jong-Un's? Could these methods apply to other adversaries beyond North Korea? And finally, how do these findings impact our current messaging to the adversary?

In sum, we conclude that all leaders have beliefs, and those beliefs shape their goals. However, not all goals turn into action, therefore understanding which goals are pursued is a worthy effort. Deciphering and identifying intent might just be the missing piece in a tailored deterrence puzzle.

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Disclosure statement