ISK Q&A: A conversation with Amira Jadoon and Andrew Mines

Amira Jadoon, Ph.D., and Andrew Mines recently visited NCITE to participate in a panel discussion on the Islamic State's activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Here, the pair discuss insights from their new book The Islamic State in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Strategic Alliances and Rivalries.

Give us background for this book. What were you seeking to accomplish when you proposed it?

When the Islamic State’s regional affiliate (IS-Khorasan/ISK) first emerged in 2015, South and Central Asian observers were generally doubtful of its potential to gain any meaningful relevance in a region already inundated with militant organizations. The group’s ideology was perceived as largely foreign to the region, and its arrival threatened pre-existing spheres of influence of notable organizations such as the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban and Islamic State’s global rival, al-Qaida. Despite all of these challenges, in its pursuit of creating a physical province (wilaya) in the region, the Islamic State successfully managed to launch a deadly campaign of violence across Pakistan and Afghanistan between 2015 and 2018 that gained it a physical stronghold in Nangarhar, Afghanistan, and a status in 2018 as the fourth deadliest terrorist organization on the planet. This is the first puzzle that motivated our book: what organizational and environmental factors underpinned ISK’s upward trajectory in the region?

Subsequently though, ISK’s notoriety triggered intense counterterrorism operations – including U.S. airstrikes, coalition operations, and clashes with the Taliban. This resulted in significant leadership and manpower losses for ISK and also dismantled its territorial control. However, last year, ISK was once again named as one of the world’s deadliest terrorist groups, marking a significant resurgence. This brings us to the second puzzle that we address in this book: what enabled ISK to survive its intense human capital and territorial losses through military operations on both sides of the border while also clashing with the Afghan Taliban, and eventually rebuild and resurge post 2020?

Within this book, we seek to identify the key factors that explain ISK’s rise, decline, and subsequent resurgence in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In doing so, we leverage original datasets on the group’s activities and losses, unclassified documents internal to the organization, and various other primary and secondary materials. The book traces the evolution of ISK's strategy as it adapted to a changing environment and offers unique insights about its leadership structure and the diversity of its members. We dive deeper into the specific ways that ISK's rivalries and alliances contributed to its capacity, resurgence, and general survival.

How did the events of 2020 and 2021 change your reporting and investigating methods for writing it?

As peace negotiations began between the U.S. and the Afghan Taliban, it was very likely that ISK was going to adapt once again and change its tactics. And as a weakened organization, it sought to exploit shifting dynamics in Afghanistan to remain relevant and to delegitimize the Taliban, who were expecting to gain some degree of political power. During this period, ISK’s evolving propaganda provided critical insights into their planning and behavior, as did their target selection. For example, to become more provocative and remain relevant, we saw an uptick in urban attacks and attacks against civilians, especially against minority populations. Though we were unable to conduct field work during this period due to the growing security concerns in the region as well as the onset of the global pandemic, we were lucky enough to have consistent access to various policymakers, government officials, local reporters, and independent researchers which allowed us to draw on various perspectives and sources.

What kind of threat does the Islamic State pose to people in Afghanistan and Pakistan?

ISK is a growing threat for all dimensions of human security across the region, and the longer the organization persists in the region, with its extremist views and tactics, the more likely it is to exacerbate general levels of terrorism, sectarian violence/divisions, displacement, and extremism in both countries. Rising levels of insecurity are certainly not conducive to political or socioeconomic stability.

Moreover, ISK’s deep linkages with local groups, such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and its ability to conduct outreach and recruitment across the broader region are indicative of a much larger problem for regional governments. They not only point to the existence of a cross-border networked militant infrastructure, but also suggest that ISK is increasingly becoming a regional threat that poses a potential risk for global security.

How does that threat manifest itself for Westerners, particularly in the U.S.?

Recent years have seen a slight uptick in the number of cases involving Western and U.S.-based persons with a nexus to ISK. The threat manifests differently across these cases. For some, it involves travel (or attempted travel) to join the group abroad. For others, it means conducting attacks on Western soil, whether inspired by or coordinated with ISK. In fact, multiple attack plot cases since ISK’s formation in 2015 have reportedly involved coordination between the group and networked operatives trying to attack targets in the West, including a failed plot in April 2020 against U.S. and NATO bases in Germany. For other Westerners, the threat manifests itself as supporters sending funds to ISK and its intermediaries using a number of mediums. These dynamics are aggravated by the continued availability and influence of legacy sermons from American preachers like Anwar al-Awlaki and Ahmad Musa Jibril, and English-language propaganda magazines such as Inspire and Dabiq.

In the U.S., travel, attacks, and financing in support of designated foreign terrorist organizations like ISK are all criminal offenses that can carry hefty sentences. Thankfully, the nationwide prevention architecture led by DHS and partner organizations has become increasingly effective at preempting terrorism-related incidents and dissuading others from making irreversible decisions. That architecture will be crucial going forward, as Taliban-ruled Afghanistan has once again created a permissive environment for jihadists of all stripes. Diminished U.S. abilities to gather intelligence and respond effectively to terrorist threats stemming from the region significantly undermines broader terrorism prevention efforts. If groups like ISK – as well as older foes like al-Qaida – can expand in the region relatively unmonitored, possibly plotting attacks against the West or its interests, then the prevention ecosystem here at home will play an increasingly pivotal role in the years ahead.

What writing or other research project is next?

In the coming weeks, we will be releasing a new report with NCITE that looks specifically at the evolving terrorism threat to the West from Afghanistan and Pakistan. ISK will feature prominently in that report, as will its global jihadist rival, al-Qaida. We will also continue to monitor, analyze, and provide new research findings on ISK’s activities, as well as those of other key regional militant organizations like the Pakistani Taliban. These groups cannot be studied in isolation from one another, and we hope to continue adding to the field’s understanding of the evolving militant landscape in South and Central Asia.

Advice for early career terrorism researchers?

Remain intellectually curious, ask questions and don’t be afraid of failure. People are often hesitant to take steps in new directions because they fear failure - but that is how you learn more about your own strengths and weaknesses and grow both personally and professionally.

Embrace new methods, perspectives, and experiences that allow you to become a well-rounded researcher. Stay connected with the top issues on practitioners’ and policymakers’ minds and think about how your research can inform good decision-making. Make time for reading and thinking critically on others’ work – and don’t be afraid to reach out to people if you are interested in collaborating with them or contributing to one of their projects.

Working in the terrorism field can be challenging in many ways; for example, working with primary sources like extremist propaganda can be mentally and emotionally taxing. Don’t be discouraged but be attentive to your own well-being and the broader context within which those sources are produced and disseminated.

Center victims of terrorism in your work and support-related initiatives; do so with respect for their experiences and without exploiting their trauma. And lastly, find positive role models and mentors in the field and stick with them.