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RECAP: NCITE Speaker Series – Countering Extremism Around Elections

On Oct. 17, NCITE hosted a webinar with researchers in the consortium to discuss the threat environment surrounding the 2024 election, including conspiracy theories, threats against election workers, and public support of political violence.

Moderator Erin Grace, on the left side of the Zoom screen, speaks with NCITE researcher Paul Gill on the right side of the Zoom screen.

Moderator Erin Grace (left) speaks with NCITE researcher Paul Gill (right).

On Oct. 17, NCITE hosted a webinar with members of the NCITE consortium to discuss the threat environment surrounding the 2024 election, including conspiracy theories, threats against election workers, and public support of political violence. Panelists were:
  • Paul Gill, Ph.D., University College London
  • Pete Simi, Ph.D., Chapman University
  • Isabelle van der Vegt, Ph.D., Utrecht University
  • Steven Windisch, Ph.D., University of Arkansas

Key Takeaways

Distinguishing between degrees of support for political violence is important. Simi said that research cited in widely read media reports often inflates the scope of the problem. That said, Simi noted even if “less than 1% of Americans believe in political violence, that’s still a very serious issue."

He said that there are three levels of support for political violence:

  1. Cultural attitudes that reinforce a general willingness to use violence.
  2. Individuals who aren’t willing to engage in violence themselves but will support others who are willing.
  3. Individuals who are willing to commit political violence.
The relationship between threats and actions is still unclear. Van der Vegt’s recent research has looked at over 2 million tweets directed at public officials in the Netherlands. But using social media to predict violent political action, she said, presents challenges. “We don’t know much yet about the overlap of what people are saying online and then what they are doing offline,” she said.
  • Simi agreed that measuring the legitimacy of threats remains an issue, particularly when surveys offer vague or leading questions. “To really get at a person’s willingness to commit political violence, you have to measure intent,” he said. “You have to get much more specific, and you should really be using very specific scenarios.”
Threats don’t need to have follow through to make an impact. As part of his research, Windisch conducted in-depth interviews with 15 election workers involved in the 2024 election cycle. They reported instances of harassment and changing their behavior to avoid harassment, such as wearing hats and sunglasses, installing security systems at their homes, and pursuing long-term therapy.
  • “January 6 acted as a credibility-enabling event,” Windisch said. “(Perpetrators) don’t need to have that immediate violence to be effective.”
Conspiracy theory beliefs interact with threats. Gill drew on his research on conspiracy theories with the U.K.’s Fixated Threat Assessment Centre. He acknowledged that there is a nexus of conspiracy beliefs and threats of violence but cautioned that, “way more people believe in conspiracy theories than the finite few … who cross over the Rubicon into illegal behavior.”
  • Van der Vegt’s initial findings suggest that toxic conspiracy rhetoric can lead to threat-making. “If people mentioned a conspiracy theory (using hashtags), they were more likely to use abusive and hateful language,” she said. “These two problems really overlap.”